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I. INTRODUCTION
We criminal law theorists are a strange lot.  I doubt any of us can
document an actual instance of unwitting justification, other, perhaps,
than the 1850 case, R. v. Dadson.1  Yet we continue to engage one another
about whether mental states of knowledge or belief are elements of the 
defense of justification, ringing changes on arguments that George Fletcher 
and Paul Robinson made in debating one another forty-two years ago.2 
We presumably continue the debate because, despite it having little 
practical import, the issue appears to call into question basic ways in
which we conceptualize criminal responsibility.  It is commonplace, for 
example, to conceptualize criminal responsibility as consisting of two 
elements—wrongdoing and culpability—where culpability, like mens rea, 
consists exclusively of an actor’s mental capacities and states, and 
wrongdoing, like actus reus, consists of something distinct from that.3 
Yet the debate over unwitting justification poses the question whether 
wrongdoing itself consists in part of the mental states with which a person 
acts. Similarly, with respect to completed offenses, it is commonplace to
conceptualize wrongdoing as consisting of the objective harms and risky
acts that the state deploys criminal statutes to prevent, all things considered, 
while culpability consists of an actor’s mental capacities and states regarding 
those harms and risky acts.4  Yet unwitting justification poses the question 
whether wrongdoing, all things considered, also takes account of an actor’s 
mental state prior to considering culpability.  Finally, it is commonplace 
to regard completed offenses as the paradigms of criminal conduct and to
regard criminal attempts as normatively—in addition to conceptually— 
derivative of them.  Yet, as we shall see, unwitting justification calls that 
assumption into question, too. 
1. R. v. Dadson (1850) 169 Eng. Rep. 407, 407; 2 Den. 35, 35 (“The prisoner was
not justified in firing at Waters, because the fact that Waters was committing a felony was 
not known to the prisoner at the time.”). 
2. See Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite
for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 288–91 (1975); see also George P. Fletcher,
The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293, 
318–21 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1559 (1999). 
4. 	Id. at 1558–59.
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I am among those who believe unwitting justification is a revealing 
window into criminal responsibility.  However, the issue concerns me for 
another reason as well: our collective inability, as theorists, to come to
consensus after more than forty years of debate makes me wonder what we 
can ever possibly agree upon, if we cannot agree about this.  Personally, I 
have always found Paul Robinson’s position so compelling in comparison
with his opponents’ position that I wonder whether our continuing disagreements 
mask emotions on all our parts that reason cannot penetrate.5  Still, I turn 
to reasoned argument because reason is the only tool we theorists possess.
I proceed in four parts.  Part II sets out the conditions of unwitting
justification and argues that (i) regardless of whether unwittingly justified
offenders are guilty of completed offenses of unjustified harm, they are 
clearly guilty of attempting to commit such offenses, and (ii) whether they 
should be punished for completed crimes of harm rather than attempt depends
upon why criminal law punishes completed offenses more severely than
impossibility attempts.  Part III argues that the best account of why harmful 
results matter is one that Plato advanced 2300 years ago in The Laws. Part 
IV applies Plato’s account to three sets of cases of unwitting justification 
and argues that, by Plato’s account, at least two of them should be treated as 
attempts rather than as completed crimes.  Finally, Part V analyzes Uwe 
Steinhoff’s claim that unwittingly justified offenders should be punished 
for completed crimes of harm rather than for crimes of attempt.
II. THE CONDITIONS OF UNWITTING JUSTIFICATION
Consider the various ways in which persons can succeed or fail to inflict 
harm on others.  A person can inflict an unjustified harm on another without
intending knowing, or—consciously or negligently—risking an unjustified
harm, for example, a target-range shooter who hits the bullseye at a shooting 
range, not intending, knowing, or—consciously or negligently—risking
that he is killing a child who has surreptitiously hidden himself behind the 
target.  A person can also inflict a justified harm on another without intending,
knowing, or—consciously or negligently—risking that he is harming 
anyone at all, for example, a target shooter who hits the bullseye at a shooting
range, not intending, knowing, or—consciously or negligently—risking that
he is killing a terrorist who has concealed himself behind the target and 
5. See Robinson, supra note 2.
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is about to explode a device that will kill everyone at the range.6  All such 
actors lack moral and legal culpability because they do not intend, know, 
or—consciously or negligently—risk that they are killing human beings. 
Conversely, a person can fail to inflict an unjustified harm on another 
while nevertheless intending, believing, or—consciously or negligently— 
risking such unjustified harm, for example, a person who shoots at a rival 
out of jealously but misses.  A person can also fail to inflict justified harm
on another while nevertheless intending, believing, or—consciously or 
negligently—risking an unjustified harm, for example, a person who shoots
at but misses a rival while unaware that the rival is about to try, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to kill him. All such actors are morally culpable of impossibility
attempts, and all of them could be punished for attempt under properly framed
criminal laws.7 
The issue of unwitting justification involves a third set of cases.  A person, 
A, commits an act of unwitting justification, as I use the term, when the
following conditions are met: (1) A harms a third person, B; (2) A intends, 
knows, or is reckless or negligent regarding the fact that he is harming B;
(3) the harm that A inflicts upon B is proportionate and necessary to protect 
A or others either from imminent harm by B or from a greater evil; and 
(4) A does not intend or know, and is not conscious of, the likelihood that 
inflicting the harm is necessary to protect himself or others from such
harm or evil. Condition 1 is included because, unless an actor actually harms
another, the issue of his being justified in inflicting harm does not arise. 
Condition 2 is included because, absent condition 2, an actor is not culpable 
of any offense, much less a completed offense.  Condition 3 is included 
because it specifies what I mean by justification for A’s inflicting harm on B.
And condition 4 is included because, absent condition 4, justification is not
unwitting. 
A note on terminology.  I am aware that for subjectivists, inserting 
justification into the term unwitting justification appears to beg the question 
by presupposing the very norm at issue.  However, I do not use the term
for that purpose.  I use unwitting justification solely for the purpose of referring 
to conditions 1–4, not for the purpose of deciding whether persons who act
under those conditions should have a defense to completed crimes of harm.
I use the term to refer to conditions that raise the latter question, not conditions 
that resolve it.  In addition, and in the interest of economy of expression, 
I confine myself to actors who intend or know that they are harming third 
6. See Uwe Steinhoff, Just War Theory: Self-Defense, Necessity, and the Ethics
of Armed Conflicts 97–98 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (posing a similar
hypothetical in the context of someone randomly shooting in a theater and accidently killing a
hitman).
7. See Gideon Yaffe, Criminal Attempts, 124 YALE L.J. 92, 95 (2014). 
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persons, rather than also discussing actors who may be reckless or negligent 
regarding the infliction of such harm because— for purposes of unwitting 
justification—I believe the moral issues are the same.8  Similarly, and for
the same reason, I confine myself to actors who do not know that inflicting
harm is necessary to protect themselves or others from wrongful harms or
lesser evils, rather than also discussing actors who are not conscious of the
likelihood that inflicting such harm is necessary because, again, I believe
the normative issues are the same. 
Like Steinhoff, I think it is useful to have paradigmatic hypotheticals of 
unwitting justification in mind.  So I am happy to accept his Jill and Earl
hypothetical, where Jill shoots and kills Earl for entirely malicious reasons, 
unaware that doing so is necessary to prevent Earl from imminently and 
wrongfully killing an innocent third person:
A. Jill and Earl 
Jill always wanted to murder Earl, whose nose she does not like. She 
sees him sitting in a restaurant, draws her gun, and shoots him dead. 
Unbeknownst to her, however, Earl, in turn, was just about to murder an
innocent business rival who was also in the restaurant, and shooting Earl
dead was the only way of preventing this.9 
Jill and Earl is useful because it illustrates something that is true of all 
unwitting justification cases: regardless of whether unwittingly justified
actors are guilty of completed crimes of harm, such as murder, they
nonetheless possess the elements of impossibility attempts to commit such
8.  Morally, a person is culpable for attempting to harm another if, while purposefully,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently disregarding the legitimate interests of the other, he 
engages in conduct that would violate the other’s interests if the facts were as he
mistakenly believes them to be. To be sure, as a matter of law, a majority of jurisdictions
confine culpability for attempt to persons who act with purpose or knowledge.  See MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985).  But cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101 (West 2018) (“A person commits 
criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission 
of an offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission 
of the offense.”).  However, the majority of jurisdictions take that position for administrative 
reasons—not because morals dictate it.  And even then, many such jurisdictions that refuse 
to use laws against attempt to punish persons who engage in reckless but otherwise harmless 
conduct nonetheless punish such persons under laws against reckless endangerment. See
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.01 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and 
Revised Comments1985).
9. Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 138 (emphasis added). 
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crimes.  This is true independently of whether jurisdictions define justification 
subjectively or objectively.  To illustrate, let us assume that two identical 
cases arise—Steinhoff’s original Jill and Earl, and an identical case, Jill-
2 and Earl-2. The difference between the two cases is that Jill & Earl
arises within Jurisdiction X that defines justification subjectively—and
thus treats Jill as culpable for murder—while Jill-2 & Earl-2 arises within
Jurisdiction Y that defines justification objectively—and thus does not 
treat Jill-2 as culpable for murder.  Let us further assume that both 
jurisdictions define murder as “the unlawful killing of another human
being with malice aforethought,”10 unlawful being a stand-in for unjustified, 
and that both jurisdictions adhere to the Model Penal Code (MPC) definition 
of impossibility attempts to commit crimes of harm, as follows: 
B. Jurisdictions X and Y
Murder. A person is guilty of murder if the person unlawfully kills 
another human being with malice aforethought.
Attempt. A person is guilty of an [impossibility] attempt to commit
a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for
commission of the crime [and,] when causing a particular result is
an element of the crime, [the person] does or omits to do anything 
with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such 
result without further conduct on his part . . . .11 
Definitions. Unlawful means without justification, as justification
is otherwise defined in this jurisdiction. 
It follows from the facts as stipulated that, regardless of whether actors 
like Jill and Jill-2 are in Jurisdiction X—which defines justification
subjectively—or in Jurisdiction Y—which defines it objectively—they
both satisfy the two elements of attempted murder under the MPC.12 
Thus, they both possess the culpability otherwise required for murder
because, having acted with the mens rea of purpose regarding both the 
harm element of killing of a human being and the circumstance element
of doing so unlawfully, they both acted with malice aforethought.13  Stated 
10.  18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2012). 
11. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARY § 5.01(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (addressing impossibility attempts to commit crimes 
of harm).
12. See id.
13. It might be argued that it was not Jill-2’s purpose to kill Earl-2 unjustifiably. 
However, purpose with respect to circumstance elements such as lack of justification
means knowledge or belief; and Jill-2 did, indeed, believe that she was killing Earl without 
justification. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 1985)
(“A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when . . . if the
424
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differently, they both acted with malice because, if each had succeeded in 
unlawfully killing Earl—as, indeed, Jill succeeded, in that she killed Earl 
in Jurisdiction X that defines justification subjectively—neither of their 
convictions for murder would have failed for lack of mens rea. Both Jill
and Jill-2 also satisfy the second element of attempt under the MPC
because they both did something with the belief that it would cause Earl
and Earl-2’s unlawful deaths “without further conduct on [their] part.”14 
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it means that the dispute between
objectivists and subjectivists is not about whether such actors should be 
punished but about what, as between attempt and completed crimes of
harm, they are most appropriately punished for. To be sure, if impossibility
attempts carried the same penalties as their respective crimes of harm,
little would turn on the choice between subjective and objective definitions
of justification.  In practice, however, jurisdictions everywhere punish at
least some impossibility attempts less severely than completed crimes of
harm.  The dispute between subjectivists and objectivists thus comes down 
to something that both sides strangely ignore; namely, the reasons why
jurisdictions punish completed crimes more severely than impossibility
attempts.15  The task, therefore, is, first, to identify those reasons and, then, 
to apply them to unwittingly justified actors to determine if the reasons militate
in favor of punishing them for completed crimes of harm or for crimes of 
attempt.
III. WHY HARMFUL RESULTS MATTER
Criminal law theorists disagree about why resulting harms matter. 
Despite their disagreements, theorists tend to concur on two things: (1) no 
one should be punished in excess of what he deserves; and (2) the state 
cannot justly punish one deserving offender less severely than another, equally-
deserving offender unless it does so for consequentialist reasons—deterrence,
an offender’s dangerousness, or administrative economy.  At the same time,
theorists differ regarding whether criminal desert is solely a function of 
element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.”).  Indeed, if belief did not suffice 
with respect to attempts to commit crimes with circumstance elements, no one could ever 
be guilty of an impossibility attempt. 
14. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.01(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST., Official
Draft and Revised Comments1985). 
15. See generally Michael Davis, Why Attempts Deserve Less Punishment than Complete 
Crimes, 5 L. & PHIL. 1 (1986). 
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the elements of attempt—possession of a guilty mind and willingness to
act on it—or whether criminal desert is also a function of resulting harm.
As a consequence, theorists who take desert to be solely a function of the 
elements of attempt—“anti-harm desert theorists”—believe it is unjust to
grade punishment on the basis of resulting harm, unless doing so can be 
justified on consequentialist grounds—which they tend to deny.16  In contrast, 
theorists who take desert to be a function of resulting harm—“pro-harm
desert theorists”—find differential punishment justified independently of 
consequentialist grounds.17 
The aforementioned theories both have advantages and disadvantages. 
Pro-harm desert theories have the advantage of explaining the nearly
universal criminal law practice of taking resulting harms into account.  But
they have the disadvantage of entailing the counterintuitive proposition that
persons deserve to be punished for consequences that are not wholly within 
their control.  In contrast, anti-harm desert theories have the advantage of 
basing desert on actions that are wholly within a person’s control—possession
of a guilty mind and willingness to act on it.  But they have the disadvantage 
of departing from the nearly universal practice of taking resulting harms 
into account in grading punishments. 
Happily, an alternative theory exists that combines the advantages of 
pro-harm and anti-harm desert theories while avoiding their disadvantages.
It is a theory that Plato advanced 2300 years ago in The Laws.18  Like anti-
harm desert theorists, Plato takes the position desert is measured by attempts
to commit crimes, regardless of outcome.19  According to Plato, actors who 
succeed in committing completed crimes and actors who fail while committing 
impossibility attempts are identical in the punishment they deserve.20  They
both deserve the same punishment because negative desert is complete when, 
being possessed of a guilty mind, an actor does everything he believes is
necessary to bring the respective harm about, regardless of what thereafter
 16. See generally, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting 
Harm Under the Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725 (1988); Sanford H. 
Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679
(1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the 
Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974). 
17. See, e.g., R. A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 116–27, 327–47 (1996); R. A. DUFF, 
INTENTION, AGENCY AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 184–92 (1990); R. A. Duff, Acting, Trying, and Criminal Liability, in ACTION AND
VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 75, 75–106 (Stephen Shute, John Gardner & Jeremy Horder eds., 
1993); Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237 (1994). 
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transpires.21  Thus, Plato writes, with respect to a malicious actor, A, who
attempts to wrongly kill another person, B, A’s criminal desert is complete 
at the point at which A fully acts on his intent to kill and is not a function 
of harms that may or may not thereafter occur.22  At the same time, Plato 
also takes the pro-harm desert position that, as between attempters who 
succeed in inflicting harm and attempters who fail, attempters who fail
should be punished less severely than attempters who succeed, albeit not 
for consequentialist reasons.23 
How, then, does Plato manage to combine anti-harm views of desert
with pro-harm views of differential punishments based on harm?  He does 
so by rejecting one of the tenets on which pro-harm and anti-harm desert
theories concur. While Plato agrees that persons should not be punished 
in excess of desert, he parts company with pro- and anti-harm desert theorists
by rejecting the view that consequentialist grounds are the only reasons 
for punishing one equally-deserving offender less severely than another.24 
He argues instead that, although attempters who succeed in committing 
grievous crimes of harm should receive the full measure of the deserved
punishment, attempters who fail should be punished less severely than they
deserve for reasons independent of deterrence, dangerousness, or economy.25 
The key to Plato’s argument is his rationale for reducing penalties for 
failed impossibility attempters.  Society should reduce penalties for failed
impossibility attempts, he says, not out of sympathy or pity for failed
attempters or because society believes them to be less deserving of blame
and suffering.26  Instead, he notes, society should reduce penalties for failed
attempts on its own account27: society should reduce such penalties because
society itself experiences—and ought to experience—different emotional 
reactions to failed attempts than to successful attempts, and because society’s 
public punishments ought to express those different reactive emotions.28 
Successful attempts inflict wrongful harms on a community and, in doing 
so, they evoke—and rightly evoke—strong moral emotions, including emotions
 21. Id. 
22. See id.
 23. Id.
 24. See Peter Westen, Why Criminal Harms Matter: Plato’s Abiding Insight in the 
Laws, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 307, 316 (2007). 
25. Id.
 26. Id.
 27. Id. 
28. Id.
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of regret that events transpired as they did and abiding grief over the
wrongful harms that innocent persons suffered.29 
In contrast, failed attempts have the opposite effect.  Failed attempts
have the effect of sparing a community from wrongful harm and, in doing
so, they evoke—and rightly evoke—emotions of profound relief that 
events did not transpire as offender envisaged them.30  Punishment, in
turn, is a vehicle by which a community expresses its reactive moral emotions 
regarding criminal conduct.31  A community that feels the same degree of 
righteous indignation when it is favored by fortune as when it is disfavored 
by fortune is a community with perverse moral emotions, at least when
serious harms like homicide are at issue.32 And a community that expresses
the same degree of resentment in the punishments it imposes is a community
that risks offending the moral order.33 




Plato confines his discussion of resulting harm to a malicious actor who 
tries but fails to kill an intended victim, and, hence, Plato does not address 
unwittingly justified actors like Jill in Jill and Earl who do kill their targets.34 
Nevertheless, I believe that it follows from Plato’s reasoning that, for
purposes of grading punishments on the basis of resulting harm, nearly all
unwittingly justified actors, if not all of them, are analogous to malefactors 
who miss their targets—not to malefactors who hit their targets. 
I shall divide unwitting justification cases into three sets: (A) cases in
which society is positively relieved by the resulting harms that actors bring 
about; (B) cases in which society, although not positively relieved by
resulting harms, feels no regret either; and (C) cases, if such cases exist, in 
which society does, indeed, regret resulting harms, despite their being justified.
A. Positive Relief
Some instances of unwitting justification cause societies to experience 
positive relief.  To illustrate in the context of self-defense, consider Jill and 
Earl.35  As previously discussed, Jill did everything she thought was necessary
 29. Id.
 30. Id.
 31. See id.
 32. See id.
 33. See id. at 316–17. 
34. PLATO, supra note 18.  For Jill and Earl, see supra pp. 423–24. 
35. See supra pp. 423–24. 
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to kill Earl and to kill him unlawfully.36  If Plato is correct, Jill fully deserves
just as much punishment as she would have deserved had she succeeded. 
However, jurisdictions are not morally obliged to give all classes of
offenders the full measure of suffering they deserve for wrongdoing. 
Rather, jurisdictions are free to withhold a portion of deserved punishment
when, for reasons that owe nothing to an actor’s efforts, they are relieved 
by the results of an actor’s unwitting conduct and, being relieved, are
naturally—and even rightly—less disposed to exact the full pound of flesh 
that is their due.  By that measure, Jill is identical to Plato’s malicious
actor. Plato’s malicious actor and Jill both tried to kill a human being 
who, as far as they knew, was no threat to them or anyone else.  Yet, despite
their intentions, Plato’s malicious actor and Jill both produced results that, 
far from leaving their respective communities in grief, left their communities 
feeling relieved.  Plato’s malicious actor’s community is relieved because, 
in failing to kill his target, Plato’s malicious actor unwittingly spared the
life of an innocent person whom he would otherwise have wrongfully murdered.
Jill’s community, in turn, is relieved because, in hitting her target, she 
stopped Earl from killing an innocent person—Earl’s business rival whom
Earl would otherwise have wrongfully murdered. To be sure, Jill differs 
from Plato’s malicious actor in that Jill committed a homicide, while the
malicious actor did not.  However, just as an otherwise omniscient community
would wish ex ante that Plato’s malicious actor not kill his target, an
otherwise omniscient community would wish ex ante that Jill kill Earl because,
given the circumstances, the alternative of Earl’s killing an innocent person 
was morally worse.
The same can also be true in choice-of-evil contexts.  Assume, for example,
that Jack maliciously sets fire to Jane’s cornfield, while being wholly
unaware that a devastating forest fire is approaching.  Jack’s fire creates a 
much-needed fire break.  Absent Jack’s fire, the forest fire would destroy 
both Jane’s cornfield and their nearby town.  Assume, too, that if the town’s 
fire fighters had deliberately set Jack’s fire to create a fire break in the face of
the oncoming blaze, they would have been feted as heroes for choosing 
the lesser evil.  Like Plato’s malicious actor, Jack is just as culpable as a
successful arsonist because Jack did everything he thought was necessary
to produce the evil of arson, all things considered.  However, Jack’s
community may rightly do what it generally does with impossibility attempts:
it may give Jack less punishment than he deserves because, far from being 
36. See supra pp. 423–24. 
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aggrieved at what Jack did, the comm
what he did, all things considered. 
unity is and ought to be relieved at 
B. Lack of Regret
Some instances of unwitting justification leave societies without feelings 
of positive relief, and, yet, without feelings of regret as well.  To illustrate 
in the context of unwitting self-defense, consider the following variation
on Jill and Earl: 
1. Jill-3 and Earl-3 
Jill-3 and Earl-3 are both NRA members who, for reasons of self-
defense, are always armed.  They are also bitter enemies.  They parted
ways years earlier and never expected to see one another again. 
Due to happenstance, however, they find themselves face to face
with one another.  Each decides at the very same instant to shoot the
other, and each undertakes to do so.  Jill-3, who succeeds in drawing 
her pistol slightly earlier than Earl-3, shoots and kills Earl-3 just as 
he is about to pull the trigger of a revolver aimed at Jill-3’s heart. 
Jill-3 and Earl-3 differs from Steinhoff’s Jill and Earl in two respects.37 
First, while it is clear that Jill acted in objective self-defense by virtue of 
killing someone who was wrongfully threatening an innocent third party,
it is less clear that Jill-3 was permitted to kill Earl-3.  The difficulty arises 
from the simultaneity of their actions.  Jill-3 cannot have been objectively
permitted to kill Earl-3 by virtue of his posing a wrongful threat to her,
because Jill-3 and Earl-3 were identically situated; and, if Earl-3 posed a 
wrongful threat to Jill-3, Jill-3 must also have posed a wrongful threat to 
Earl-3, thereby depriving Jill-3 of permission to kill him.  By the same token,
however, Jill-3 cannot have posed a wrongful threat to Earl-3 that permitted 
him to kill her because, again, the two actors were identically situated; 
and, if Jill-3 posed a wrongful threat to Earl-3, Earl-3 must have posed a 
wrongful threat to her, thereby depriving himself of permission to use 
lethal force against her.  Nevertheless, Jill-3 and Earl-3 remain objectively 
permitted to use lethal force against one other to protect themselves, albeit 
not because either was a wrongful threat to the other.  They are objectively 
permitted to do so because all actions are either permissible or wrongful; 
because the state should not punish a person for producing a wrongful harm 
unless he actually causes produces it; and because, given the paradoxical 
37. See Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 138. 
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effects of simultaneity, the state cannot declare Jill-3 to have caused a
wrongful harm without contradicting itself. 
Second, Jill-3 differs from Jill because, while society is positively
relieved that Jill killed Earl, society is not relieved that Jill-3 killed Earl-
3 because the alternative would have been morally identical—Earl-3 killing 
Jill-3. Nevertheless, despite not being relieved by Jill-3’s conduct, society 
does not regret it either.  To be sure, society regrets that Jill-3 and Earl-3 
ended up confronting each another, and society regrets that they both reacted 
in anger by trying to kill each other.  But, given that those circumstances 
occurred, society does not regret the harm that resulted from Jill-3’s conduct
because society realizes that, if Jill-3 had not killed Earl-3, Earl-3 would 
have killed her. 
Society’s lack of regret at Earl-3’s death is significant because it bears 
upon the distinction society draws in penalties between impossibility attempts 
and crimes of resulting harm.  Like Plato’s society, societies today generally
reserve their highest penalties for persons who bring about the material
harms that societies seek to prevent by means of punishment and regret 
when they occur.  By the same token, societies today generally impose lesser
penalties on persons who, in failing to bring such harms about, leave 
societies with no emotions of regret or grief under the circumstances.  Jill-
3 tried to bring about the harm of unlawful homicide, and she should be 
punished for attempting to do so.  But she failed because, despite being
unaware that she was doing so, she permissibly killed someone who otherwise 
would have killed her. 
The same is true of some actors who choose the lesser of two evils. 
However, it is important to make two points beforehand.  First, and contrary
to what the MPC seems to imply,38 if the lesser-of-two-evils principle is
morally just, the metric by which it measures harms and evils cannot be a 
utilitarian one. That is, it is not a metric that asks, “As between harm X 
and harm Y, which harm causes less total unhappiness among victims,
considered as a group?”  A utilitarian metric of that kind would justify 
actions that are patently immoral—involuntarily harvesting a healthy person’s 
body parts to save five dying patients. Rather, if the lesser-of-two-evils 
principle is truly just, the metric by which it measures harms and evils must 
be a moralized and contextualized one that takes multiple factors into 
considerations: whether an actor is inflicting morally wrongful harm as opposed
to a harm that is not morally wrongful, whether an actor’s conduct consists
 38. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 1985). 
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of an action as opposed to an omission, and the manner in which harms 
are brought about, for example, switching a trolley to another track as 
opposed to pushing a fat man onto the tracks.39 
Second, if it is to be just, the lesser-of-two-evils principle cannot be 
confined to justifying the lesser evils but must also justify all that are not 
greater evils.  To be sure, this caveat is immaterial if all evils are either 
lesser or greater than one another.  However, if some evils are neither
greater nor lesser but instead equal to one another in gravity, it would be
fundamentally unjust to punish a person who has no choice but to opt for
one or the other.  It would be fundamentally unjust because, in addition to
punishing a person who had no choice but to inflict an equal evil, it would 
mean punishing a person for bringing about a harm that, by definition, the 
state is indifferent about wishing to prevent under the circumstances.40 
With these two caveats in mind, consider a hypothetical Steinhoff adopts 
from Jonathan Quong:
2. Man on the Track 
There is a runaway trolley whose brakes have failed headed down
a track where your child is trapped and will be killed by the trolley.
Fortunately there is a side track onto which the trolley can be
diverted, but there is one man trapped on this side track, and he will 
be killed if you divert the trolley.41 
Steinhoff believes, and Quong agrees, that the parent is permitted to 
divert the trolley in order to save his child, even though it means killing 
the stranger on the side track.42  Now consider the following variation: 
3. Unwitting Parent in “Man on the Track”
There is a runaway trolley whose brakes have failed headed down a track 
where a mother’s child is trapped and will be killed by the trolley.  The 
mother is unaware that the runaway trolley puts anyone’s life in danger, 
39. For the proposition that the metric for measuring evils for purposes of necessity
cannot be based upon net social utility, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 565 (5th ed. 2009); Alan Brudner, A Theory of Necessity, 7 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 339, 341–44 (1987); Edward M. Morgan, The Defence of Necessity:
Justification or Excuse?, 42 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 165, 170 (1984); John T. Parry, The
Virtue of Necessity: Reshaping Culpability and the Rule of Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 397,
414, 438 (1999). 
40. Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification,
Not an Excuse—and Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 883–88 (2003). 
41. Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 167 (adopting the Man on the Track hypothetical initially
proposed in Jonathan Quong, Killing in Self-Defense, 119 ETHICS 507, 512 (2009)). 
42. Id.
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much less her child’s.  However, she sees that if she diverts the trolley on 
to a side track where an enemy of hers is trapped, the trolley will kill him.
The mother diverts the trolley, thereby killing her enemy, only to discover 
afterwards to her relief that doing so was necessary to save her child’s life. 
I do not know whether Steinhoff and Quong are correct that society 
does not regret—or, at least, ought not regret—the death of the innocent
person in Man on the Tracks, given the alternative harm that would have 
occurred, although I am inclined to think they are.  However, if Steinhoff 
and Quong are correct that society does not regret the resulting harm in 
Man on the Track, society cannot regret the resulting harm in Unwitting 
Parent in “Man on the Track” either, because, from an objective standpoint,
the actions, resulting harms, and alternatives are the same.  In both cases,
a parent saves the life of a child on the track of a runaway trolley by diverting 
a runaway trolley into the fatal path of an innocent person who otherwise 
would have lived. 
To be sure, society is indignant—and righteously indignant—toward 
the mother in Unwitting Parent in “Man on the Track” because of the 
harm she tried to bring about, that is, the harm of killing an innocent person
where the alternative was no harm at all.  And society is right to be indignant 
and to want the mother to suffer because it is a crime for one to do all one
thinks is necessary to kill a person whose death society regrets under the 
circumstances, even if one does not ultimately succeed.43  However, the 
crime of trying and failing to cause a homicide that society regrets under
the circumstances is attempted murder, not murder.44 Murder is reserved for 
homicides that society wishes had not occurred under the circumstances.
C. Regret
I have thus far addressed instances of unwitting justification that leave 
society with no regrets, that is, with no wish that persons had acted otherwise 
given the alternatives. However, instances of unwitting justification may 
occur that leave society with just such regret.  Consider, for example, a 
hypothetical of Jeff McMahan’s that Steinhoff summarizes as follows:
 43. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 1985). 
44. Compare id. (delineating the circumstances of an attempted crime), with id. § 210.2 
(delineating the circumstances of a completed murder crime).
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1. Tactical Bombers 
There is a bomber crew of 5 people who have, in the context of a
humanitarian intervention, the mission to bomb and destroy a military
target. If they are successful, 100 innocent civilians in the state in 
which the intervention takes place will be saved, and there are no 
alternative means of saving them. However, 5 innocent villagers will 
be killed in this attack as a side-effect.45 
McMahan believes, and Steinhoff assumes, that the bombers’ planned 
attack on the military target is both “proportionate and justified.”46 Steinhoff
also believes, while McMahan does not, that the innocent villagers would 
be justified in defending themselves by firing on the bomber pilots.47 
With that in mind, consider the following variation:
2. Unwitting Villagers 
The bombers in Tactical Bombers make an initial pass over the military
target, dropping a small bomb that kills nearby animals.  The 5 villagers
are furious and decide at that very moment to retaliate.  The bombers
return in order to commence what, without the villagers’ realizing it,
is a bombing run that will destroy the target and kill the villagers.  The 
villagers fire on the bombers, unwittingly saving their own lives but
at the cost of 5 crew members and 100 innocent civilians whom the
bombers would otherwise have saved.
I do not know whether Steinhoff is correct in thinking that the villagers 
in Tactical Bombers are permitted to attack the bombers to defend themselves, 
though I am inclined to think he is.  However, even if the villagers in Tactical
Bombers are both permitted and nonculpable in defending themselves, the 
villagers in Unwitting Villagers can, at the very least, be justly punished 
for attempted homicide.  They satisfy the elements of attempted homicide 
because, while acting in the belief that they were unlawful combatants, they
did everything they believed necessary to kill a bombing crew that they
believed was no threat to themselves. 
The more interesting question, however, is whether the villagers’ culpability
in Unwitting Villagers is confined to that of attempted homicide or whether 
it extends to the graver crime of criminal homicide.  If Plato and others 
are correct, the villagers in Unwitting Villagers deserve just as much punishment 
45. Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 187 (summarizing a hypothetical included in Jeff 
McMahan, Self-Defense Against Justified Threateners, in HOW WE FIGHT: ETHICS IN WAR
104, 104–05 (Helen Frowe & Gerald Lang eds., 2014)).
46. Id.
 47. Id. at 188. 
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as unlawful combatants who impermissibly kill a justified bombing crew.48 
However, it does not follow that society ought to give both sets of 
offenders the full punishment they theoretically deserve.  Whether society 
ought to do so depends upon whether and, if so, why society is justified
in punishing impossibility attempts less severely than completed crimes 
of harm.  If Plato is correct, society is justified in giving even heinous 
offenders less punishment than they deserve when, for reasons that are of
no credit to themselves, they fail to bring about harms that society regrets, 
all things considered.  By that measure, it can be argued that the villagers 
in Unwitting Villagers should not be given less punishment than they
deserve because they arguably did bring about a harm that society regrets, 
all thing considered—the death of 105 persons in lieu of 5.
Now it might be thought that, because the villagers in Unwitting Villagers
inflict the same harm as villagers in Tactical Bombers, and because the
latter villagers are permitted to inflict the harm, the harm itself cannot
simultaneously be permissible and regrettable, all things considered.  But
that is not so. Whether an act is permissible depends upon whether it is a 
criminal wrong, that is, an act that society wishes to prevent by means of 
criminal law.  Whether an act is regrettable depends upon whether it is an
act that society wishes had come out differently.  A society can simultaneously 
take the position that the villagers’ act in Tactical Bombers is not a criminal 
wrong and, yet, wish the villagers had not committed it.  To illustrate, consider 
the following: 
3. Breeching a Levy to Save a Town 
Rising flood waters threaten to flood a downstream town and kill
hundreds of sleeping residents.  A resident of the town, on orders
from the governor, commences to breech an upstream levy in order 
to divert flood waters to an adjacent flood plain, though doing so 
will flood a nearby farm and killing a family of three that lives
there. A member of the family notices the threat to himself and 
his family and, armed with a long-range rifle, shoots at the town
resident, hoping to hit his target and prevent the resident from
breaching the levy. 
I assume that, if Judith Thomson’s man-at-the-switch is justified in 
diverting a runaway trolley and thereby killing one on a side track to save 
48. See PLATO, supra note 18. 
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five, the town resident is justified in diverting the rising river and thus
drown three to save hundreds.49  I also assume that, if Steinhoff is correct 
that the villagers in Tactical Bombers may kill the bomber crew to defend 
themselves, the farmer may kill the town resident to prevent the resident
from killing himself and his family.50  On those assumptions, it follows
that, if the farmer succeeds in hitting his target, the farmer will not be 
punished for homicide.  However, it does not also follow that the society
as a whole is indifferent as to whether the farmer hits or misses his target. 
On the contrary, the society can simultaneously (1) maintain that, because
of agent-relative considerations, the farmer is permitted to do his best to
hit his target and, yet, (2) fervently hope that the farmer misses his target.
V. STEINHOFF’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION
Steinhoff criticizes objective justification on four independent grounds: 
(A) it misconstrues the linguistic meaning of justification; (B) it requires 
that, if unwittingly justified actors are acquitted of completed crimes of 
harm, they must also be acquitted of criminal attempts and thereby “get 
entirely off the hook”; (C) it makes justified defense practically impossible;
and (D) it misconstrues morality by failing to provide persons with “action- 
guidance.”51 
A. Objective Justification Misconstrues the Linguistic 

Meaning of Justification 

Steinhoff claims that objective justification is inconsistent with linguistic
usage regarding self-defense:
If someone jumps out of the window above me with the intention to crush me and
I, unaware of this fact, intentionally open my umbrella because it has started
raining, and thereby avert his attack, then hardly anyone would say that I defended
myself. . . . A roof tile knocking out my would-be murderer on a windy night also
saves me, but no ordinary speaker would seriously say that the roof tile ‘defended’
me.52 
Steinhoff may be correct about ordinary language. But it begs the question 
to assume that criminal law adopts lay usage as its own.  If objectivists
are correct, self-defense is a term of art in law for actions by persons that 
are necessary and proportionate to protect them from wrongful harm.  By
 49. See generally Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395
(1985).
50. See Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 187. 
51. Id. at 159. 
52. Id. at 138–39. 
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that measure, Steinhoff’s action of opening his umbrella is, indeed, self-
defense, even though laypersons would use another term for it. 
B. Objective Justification Requires That Unwittingly Justified  

Actors Get Off the Hook Entirely 

Steinhoff argues that, if objectivists are correct that unwittingly justified 
actors are not guilty of completed crimes of harm, it follows that actors
like “Jill should get entirely off the hook.”53  Actors like Jill must be let 
off the hook, he says, because it is “incoherent” to acquit an actor on grounds
of justification and, yet, simultaneously convict him or her of attempted
harm based upon the same underlying act.54 
In Part II we saw that, within jurisdictions that define objectively, it is 
perfectly possible to frame criminal statutes in a way that renders Jill
guilty of attempted murder and, yet, not guilty of murder.55  Indeed, all 
crimes of harm within such jurisdictions can be framed in that way.
Jurisdictions can render actors guilty of attempted harm and not guilty of 
completed harm by (i) defining crimes of harm as the causing of unlawful
harms, (ii) defining unlawful objectively, and (iii) adopting MPC standards 
regarding impossibility attempts.
Steinhoff recognizes this.  He recognizes that, as a matter of law, statutes
can be drafted to inculpate actors of attempt while acquitting them of
completed crimes on grounds of justification.56  His argument is different.
He argues that, if a homicide like Jill’s is morally and legally justified, it 
is incoherent to adjudge her guilty of attempted homicide based upon the 
same act because that would mean that the same act is “justified and
unjustified”:
While it is indeed completely consistent, given a suitable definition of murder, to
say that Jill’s successful killing of Earl was only attempted murder, it is not 
consistent to say that Jill’s killing of Earl was both justified and unjustified.  Thus if
Jill’s killing of Earl was attempted murder, and we deem attempted murder to be 
unjustified and impose criminal (and moral) liability for it on the act’s perpetrator, 
then we cannot simultaneously say that the killing of Earl was justified self-
53. Id. at 139. 
54. Id. at 145. 
55. See supra pp. 423–24. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. LAW INST.,
Official Draft 1985) (delineating the circumstances of a completed murder crime), with id.
§ 5.01 (delineating the circumstances of an attempted crime).
56. See Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 139–40. 
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defense. One and the same act cannot be simultaneously unjustified attempted 
murder and justified self-defense.57 
With due respect, I believe Steinhoff’s notion of unjustified attempt is 
a contradiction in terms. It is a category mistake to think that criminal
attempts, once complete, are acts to which justification and lack of justification
apply.  Justification and the lack of it apply to offenses that are framed in 
terms of prima facie harms.  Justification, and the lack of it, comes into
play after an actor inflicts or risks such a prima facie harm, and does so to
determine whether the harm he inflicted—or believed he was inflicting— 
was a harm the state does, indeed, wish to prevent, all things considered.
In contrast, criminal attempt is not a crime of prima facie harm.  It is a 
crime of intent of which the so-called act of attempt is merely constitutive 
evidence. 
The difference is significant because, in contrast to offenses of prima 
facie harm, where matters of justification come into play after an offense 
is committed, matters of justification come into play before an attempt is 
committed.  They come into play to determine whether a person is guilty 
of attempt at all—and, specifically, to determine whether what the person
intends to do is, indeed, a harm or risk of harm that the state seeks to 
prevent, all things considered. If what a person intends to do is justified, 
a person is not guilty of attempt; if what a person intends to do is not
justified, the person is guilty of attempt, provided the person engages in a 
requisite act and has the requisite mens rea regarding lack of justification. 
Thus, contrary to Steinhoff, there is no such thing as a justified attempt. 
A person who possesses the requisite intent and acts on it is guilty and 
ought to be punished, and to ask thereafter whether the attempt is justified
or unjustified is meaningless. 
Steinhoff relies to the contrary on what he believes to be implications
of comments by Paul Robinson.  Paul Robinson has argued that persons 
who commit impossibility attempts inflict intangible harm on their targets,
which I take to be the dignitary harm that attempters inflict by doing their 
best to cause intended targets tangible harm.58  Steinhoff relies on Robinson’s
statement to argue that, if attempts do indeed inflict harm, they should be 
treated like crimes of prima facie harm and, therefore, once committed,
be assessed in light of any alternative harms that would have occurred in 
their absence, to determine if the attempts are justified.59  I take no position
here on whether attempts inflict dignitary harm on their targets.  But, even
if they do, it is a category mistake to classify such dignitary harms as being 
57. Id. at 140. 
58. See Robinson, supra note 2, at 291. 
59. See Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 141–45. 
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commensurate with the prima facie harm that completed crimes inflict. 
Completed crimes are framed in terms of prima facie harms, and they are
made criminal to prevent the harms from occurring—unless, of course,
committing such crimes prevents greater harms from occurring.60  In contrast,
crimes of attempt are not framed in terms of dignitary harms, and they are 
not made criminal to prevent dignitary harms from occurring.  The law 
criminalizes attempts to punish persons for what they intend to do as revealed 
through their acts, not because of any dignitary harms they may inflict in
the process. And, therefore, the law does not weigh such dignitary harms
against alternative harms that would otherwise occur to determine if 
attempts are justified or not. 
Steinhoff, at the 2016 San Diego conference on his work, proposed a 
hypothetical designed to show that criminal attempts, after they are complete,
can be justified by the favorable consequences they produce.  In reality, 
Steinhoff’s hypothetical shows the opposite: attempt is a crime of intent 
that is complete when an actor forms an intent to do what is unjustified and 
acts on the intent, and nothing of consequence that thereafter transpires 
can exculpate him of doing so.  Steinhoff’s hypothetical goes as follows: 
Imagine the sadistic villain Scarlet credibly and truthfully threatens poor Kevin
as follows: “If you do not [try] hard to steal the Matisse from the museum, I will
explode an atomic bomb in New York.  And if you actually succeed in stealing
the Matisse, I will do so too.  So your only hope is that the attempt gets thwarted.
But you know that I can see if you do not try hard.”  Kevin’s best bet to steal the 
Matisse is by sneaking into the museum’s post office and changing the address 
on the envelope in which the Matisse has been put in order to send it to the art
restorer.  Kevin does that.  The only way to leave the museum is via a Star Trek
transporter, which will transport him into an isolation chamber where he has to
remain for a week without any possibility of escape or communication.  The 
envelope, however, would only need a day to arrive at Kevin’s house. Kevin
intends to keep the Matisse if he gets it and New York is destroyed—which he 
hopes won’t happen.  Thus he really does intend to steal it although he hopes not 
to succeed.  Moreover, once Kevin has been transported to the isolation chamber
his attempt is completed.  It is out of his hands now.61 
Steinhoff further states that Kevin takes sufficient steps in fulfillment 
of his intent to demonstrate that he is committed to carrying it out.62  But
 60. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.02 (AM. LAW INST., Official 
Draft 1985). 
61.  Uwe Steinhoff, Replies 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 469, 503 (2018). 
62. Id. at 503–04. 
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before he succeeds in mailing the Matisse to his house, a third party
intervenes to thwart the theft and spare New York City as a consequence.63 
Based upon these facts, Steinhoff reasons that (1) Kevin satisfied the 
elements of attempted theft because what he intended to—steal the Matisse, 
with its consequence of destroying New York City—was unjustified, and,
yet, (2) Kevin’s criminal attempt to steal it was ultimately justified and,
hence, a basis for exculpation, given that it resulted in a thwarting of the 
theft and a negating of the bomb threat.64  I think Steinhoff is mistaken on
both counts.
Let us start with Steinhoff’s conclusion that Kevin satisfied the 
elements of attempted theft because what Kevin intended to do—steal the
Matisse—was unjustified.  Whether a person is justified in committing a 
crime depends upon the relative gravity of the alternative evils that would 
otherwise occur.65  If the crime the person inflicts is greater in evil than 
the alternative evil that would otherwise occur, he is unjustified in committing 
the crime.  Otherwise, he is justified.66  With respect to attempt, a person 
is guilty only if what he intends to do—including any crime he intends to 
commit—is unjustified by the alternatives that would otherwise occur.
And with respect to theft, a person is guilty of attempted unjustified theft 
only if what he intends to do—including any theft he intends to commit— 
is unjustified by the alternatives that would otherwise occur. 
Now consider the dilemma Kevin faced.  Two slim possibilities existed
for Kevin to avert an atomic blast: (1) to give third parties some time to
thwart the theft by stalling, dissembling, and otherwise pretending to steal
the Matisse without actually intending to do so, knowing that any effort
to dissemble might cause Scarlet to immediately detonate the bomb; or
(2) to give third parties some time to thwart the theft without risking an 
explosion in the meantime by meticulously taking the multiple necessary
steps on his part to complete the theft, knowing that, if the steps were they 
not interrupted as he hoped they would be, Scarlet would detonate the 
bomb as a consequence.  Given Kevin’s grim alternatives, it can hardly be
said that the latter alternative, which is what Kevin chose, was the wrong
course of action under the circumstances.  Because it was not the wrong 
course for a person in Kevin’s position to take, Kevin, by virtue of intending
 63. Id.
 64. Id.
 65. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.02 (AM. LAW INST., Official 
Draft 1985). 
66. See id. 
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it, did not intend what was unjustified and, hence, was not guilty of attempted
unjustified theft.67 
Steinhoff’s second conclusion is based on the assumption that Kevin
satisfied the elements of attempting to commit a theft that he knew to be 
unjustified. So let us assume, contrary to what I have argued above, that
Kevin satisfied the elements of attempted theft.  On that assumption, Steinhoff 
argues that because the consequences of Kevin’s attempted theft were that
the theft was thwarted and New York City was saved, the latter favorable
consequences justified Kevin’s criminal attempt and should exculpate him 
of what would otherwise have been an unlawful, criminal attempt.68 
Again, Steinhoff mistakenly conflates justification with a category of 
offense—attempt—to which it does not apply.  Crimes of prima facie harm 
can be justified by their consequences because such crimes are framed in 
terms of harms that society seeks to prevent, and they therefore serve no 
purpose when an actor, by committing them, spares society even greater 
harm, all things considered.  Crimes of attempt are not framed in terms of
harm.  They are crimes of intent—and, specifically, intent to inflict unjustified
harm—and they are complete when such intents are formed and acted 
upon, and nothing that thereafter happens as a consequence can justify it.
To illustrate, assume that a shopkeeper shoots to kill a fleeing shoplifter, 
knowing that the law bars the use of deadly force to prevent a shoplifter 
from escaping.  The shopkeeper misses, and the shoplifter remains unharmed. 
However, as a result of the shooting, the police arrive, notice a fire in a 
nearby apartment house, call the fire department, and save many families
that would otherwise have burned to death.  The shopkeeper’s attempted
murder clearly had favorable consequences that society welcomes given 
67. I put aside an additional reason why Kevin is not guilty of attempted unjustified 
theft. Attempt is a crime of intent, and therefore, an actor is not culpable unless he possessed 
mens rea regarding lack of justification.  Compare MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §
3.04(2)(b) (stating that a person who tries and fails to kill another is not guilty of attempted 
murder if he believes that doing so is necessary to protect himself from death or grievous 
bodily harm, even if his belief is unreasonable), with People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 110–
16 (1986) (reasoning that a person who tries and fails to kill another in the actual belief 
that doing so is necessary to protect himself from death or grievous bodily harm is 
nevertheless guilty of attempted murder if his belief was unreasonable).  Given that Kevin 
chose to steal—in lieu of pretending to steal—because he thought stealing maximized his 
chances that the theft would be thwarted, he clearly believed his action was justified under
the circumstances.  In addition, given that the course of action he chose did thwart the theft
and spare New York City, he can hardly have been negligent in believing that stealing was 
preferable to pretending to steal. 
68. Steinhoff, supra note 61, at 503–05. 
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the alternatives. But none of that exculpates the shopkeeper of attempted
unjustified murder because his was a crime of intended unjustified action 
that was completed when he acted on it. 




Steinhoff believes that the “gravest [problem with objectivism] is that
it [renders justification] practically impossible.”69  Objectivism does so, 
he says, because it implies a necessity requirement that self-defenders can
at best satisfy by “pure blind luck.”70 
To illustrate, Steinhoff revisits Jill’s killing of Earl.  Steinhoff previously
stipulated that it was “necessary” for Jill to kill Earl to prevent Earl from 
wrongfully killing a rival.71  Steinhoff later questions the stipulation, arguing
that for objectivists, it is rarely, if ever, necessary for an actor like Jill to 
kill another in self-defense because, regardless of how unlikely and fortuitous
such possibilities may be, objective possibilities nearly always exist for 
bringing about milder outcomes that would effectively prevent wrongdoers 
like Earl from causing wrongful harm.72  For example, Jill’s pulling the
trigger the exact moment and in the exact direction necessary for her bullet
to collide in midair with Earl’s bullet thereby renders Earl’s bullet harmless.73 
To be sure, actors like Jill quite likely lack the knowledge and skill needed 
to ensure such milder outcomes or even make them likely to occur.  Yet
such outcomes are nevertheless possible.  And because they are nearly always
possible, it is rarely if ever necessary for an actor like Jill to kill or seriously 
harm another to defend herself or others: 
[I]t is a simple fact of physics that . . . if Jill had fired a shot at a certain time t 
while holding her weapon in a certain position p the bullet of her gun would have 
struck the bullet coming out of Earl’s gun in midair and deviated it in such a way 
as to save the life of Earl’s innocent rival.  Of course, there is no way that Jill can
know which time and position that is, but since we are talking about objective 
justification, this is irrelevant . . . . Jill could, objectively speaking, do all the
things I have just described . . . and thus it was objectively unnecessary and
unjustified for her to kill Earl. This holds for virtually all cases of self-defense
with a firearm.  (Similar things, of course, can be said for similar reasons about 
all other kinds of self-defense: There will have hardly ever existed a case of self-
defense where, objectively speaking, the same defensive result could not have
been achieved with a milder means.)74
 69. Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 159. 
70. Id.
 71. Id. at 138. 
72. Id. at 147. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 148. 
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The theoretical existence of such milder possibilities has two consequences 
for objectivists, Steinhoff argues.75  For one thing, it means that persons 
like Jill are rarely, if ever, objectively justified in defending themselves or 
others.  For another, it means that self-defenders like Jill are actually culpable 
for the unjustified harms they inflict because, given that it is evident that 
such milder possibilities exist, self-defenders must be aware of them, and, 
if they are not, they are negligent for being unaware of them.76 
Steinhoff’s argument suffers from two problems that, I believe, are fatal 
to his position: (1) his critique, if valid, applies as much to his own theory
of justification as to objective justification, thereby producing the reductio 
ad absurdam that, regardless of which theory one adopts, justified self-
defense hardly ever obtains; and (2) his critique is premised on an erroneous
notion of necessity for purposes of objective justification. 
1. Steinhoff’s Critique Applies as Much to His Own Theory of 
Justification as to Objectivism 
Steinhoff’s view of justification is mixed in that it is neither wholly
objectivist nor wholly subjectivist in nature.  Steinhoff takes the position 
that a self-defender is justified if, and only if, the self-defender “knows
that the objective conditions of justified self-defense are fulfilled [and that 
a self-defender has] ‘knowledge’ [if, and only if, he has an] epistemically 
justified . . . true belief.”77 An actor like Jill is not justified, therefore,
unless she believes that killing Earl is the mildest thing she can do to
prevent Earl from wrongfully killing his rival and it is also true that killing 
Earl is the mildest thing she can do to prevent Earl from killing his rival. 
With Steinhoff’s mixed theory in mind, let us return to Steinhoff’s 
critique of objectivism.  Steinhoff criticizes objectivism on the ground that 
it leads to the reductio that (i) no one is hardly ever justified in killing in
self-defense, and (ii) nearly everyone who kills in self-defense believing 
it is necessary is culpable for thinking so.78  Notice, however, that because 
Steinhoff takes the position that, to be justified, an actor must believe in 
necessity and his belief must be “true,” Steinhoff’s theory suffers from the 
same reduction as he attributes to objectivism.79  Consider Jill. Jill believed
 75. Id.
 76. Id. at 149. 
77. Id. at 157–58 (footnote omitted). 
78. Id. at 149. 
79. Id. at 158 (emphasis omitted). 
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it was necessary to kill Earl to prevent him from wrongfully harming his 
rival.  However, Steinhoff has shown—and Steinhoff is correct—that 
measured by everything that it was theoretically possible for Jill to do,
killing Early was not the mildest thing that Jill could have done to prevent 
Earl from wrongfully harming his rival, and Jill’s belief to the contrary
was not true. 80  On Steinhoff’s own theory, therefore, it follows that Jill 
was not only not justified in killing Earl but also culpable in thinking otherwise. 
Steinhoff has a response to this.  He acknowledges that under his mixed
theory, a self-defender is not justified unless, in addition to the defender 
knowing that the objective conditions of self-defense obtain, it is also true
that those objective conditions obtain.81  Nonetheless, he argues that because
it is wrong to define objective conditions to include any and all milder 
means by which defenders could in theory protect themselves, his theory— 
in contrast to objectivism—does not define objective conditions in that 
way.82  As I argue below, I agree with him that it is wrong to define the conditions 
of self-defense—and, particularly, to define necessity—to include any and
all milder means by which defenders could in theory protect themselves.83 
Indeed, it is precisely because it is wrong that objectivism is not obliged 
to adopt it, any more than Steinhoff adopts it for purposes of his mixed
theory. 
2. Steinhoff’s Critique is Based on a Mistaken Notion of Necessity
Fortunately, there is a way escape Steinhoff’s reductio. His reductio is based
upon a mistaken notion of necessity.  Although Steinhoff may be right
that it is theoretically possible for actors like Jill to do milder things to 
protect themselves than resort to homicide, he is mistaken that theoretical
possibilities of that kind constitute the metric by which necessity is 
measured for purposes of objective justification.84  The appropriate metric 
for objective justification is not an ex post measure of the mildest act 
that it is theoretically possible for Jill to have performed, however 
infinitesimally small such possibilities might be.  It is an ex ante measure 
of probabilities as they existed at the time Jill acted.  It is an ex ante 
measure of the mildest act that it is likely that Jill, given her individual
physical and psychological capacities, could have succeeded in bringing 
about to prevent the harm.  Anything less would oblige self-defenders,
 80. Id. at 147–48. 
81. Id. at 157–58. 
82. See id. at 150; Steinhoff, supra note 61, at 510. 
83. Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 147–48. 
84. See id.
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under penalty of punishment, to either sacrifice themselves to wrongful
aggression or perform actions they have no likelihood of accomplishing. 
This does not mean that the metric is “epistemic”85 in being subjective
to the actor at issue.  The metric is an objective standard in being based
upon society’s considered judgment regarding the ex ante probabilities 
that existed at the time the actor acted, regardless of whether the actor
himself was, or was not, aware of the probabilities at the time.86  Nor does
the metric reduce the metric to a “reasonability requirement”87 in being 
based upon facts known to the actor at the time he acted.  It is based upon 
such facts regarding ex ante probabilities as society is aware of at the time
of judgment, regardless of whether they were or were not known by the
actor at the time he acted.  It means that, regardless of whether one is an 
objectivist or mixed-view adherent like Steinhoff, an actor need not elect 
a milder over a harsher means for defending himself, unless, in society’s 
judgment and based upon facts known to society at the time of judgment, 
an ex ante probability existed that the actor was likely to succeed in 
bringing about the milder means.
D. Objective Justification Fails to Provide Action Guidance 
Finally, Steinhoff argues that objectivism fails the essential test of morality 
because it assesses right conduct by the results of an actor’s actions rather
than by beliefs: 
[A] purely objectivist account cannot provide proper action-guidance.  To wit, if
a proponent of this view is asked by someone: “I would like to go into a full 
theater and shoot randomly at the guests, is that permissible?”, then on pain of 
inconsistency the proponent would have to answer: “Well, that depends on who
you will hit.  If you hit people like Earl (or Hitler), it’s fine, otherwise not.” . . . . 
These answers, however, would certainly not be given by ordinary speakers, that 
is, by speakers who understand what terms like “permissible” and “justified”
mean . . . . [W]hat we expect from morality is action-guidance . . . . [M]orality
should be able to advise human beings as to how they should act under conditions 
of imperfect information . . . . 
. . . .
. . . It is not permissible to go to a vegetable market in order to “randomly spray
a large crowd of people with bullets,” not even if, accidentally, one shoots the 
85. Id. at 147. 
86. Kenneth W. Simons, Self-Defense: Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable Self-Control?, 
2 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51, 57–58 (2008). 
87. Steinhoff, supra note 6, at 150 (emphasis omitted).
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“right” person.  By acting in the irresponsible way the gunman acted, he might 
not have violated the rights of the innocent people in the market, yet he nevertheless 
showed insufficient respect for them . . . . [A]n agent who engages in some act 
that is normally prohibited . . . must be required to have a reasonable belief that
the objective justifying circumstances are fulfilled . . . .88 
Steinhoff is right that morality should provide persons with guidance. 
But he is wrong that objective justification fails to do so, at least regarding 
Plato’s objectivist account.  A Platonic objectivist envisages the very same
action guidance as Steinhoff because, like Steinhoff, he assesses a person’s 
criminal desert by the wrong that the person believes or ought to know he 
is in fact committing, not by harms that result from his fully acting on his 
beliefs. A Platonic objectivist would give the vegetable-market shooter 
the very same warning that Steinhoff would give him.  They would both
warn him, “Do not try to kill people whom you believe or ought to know
you are unjustified in killing.”  The only difference between the two lies 
in what they would punish the shooter for. Steinhoff would punish the
shooter for murder; in contrast, a Platonic objectivist would punish the
shooter for attempted unjustified murder—that is, for trying but failing to 
kill persons whose deaths society regrets, all things considered. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Uwe Steinhoff, being a mixed subjectivist and objectivist, maintains 
that a person has a defense of justification if, and only if, the person’s
conduct is objectively justified, and the person believes his conduct is
justified—thus denying a defense to a person who is unaware of it.  I argue 
that Steinhoff’s criticisms of objective justification fail, in part, because 
he neglects to address the most persuasive account we possess regarding
why and when resulting harms matter in criminal law.
Ultimately, the issue of unwitting justification has less practical significance 
than theoretical significance for what it reveals about criminal responsibility.
It is often said that criminal law is wholly or largely designed to protect 
citizens from unjustified harms.89  Unfortunately, the fact that criminal 
law largely or wholly aims to prevent unjustified harms can mislead one 
regarding the content of criminal offenses. 
First, the emphasis on preventing unjustified harms can mislead one
regarding the nature of paradigmatic criminal offenses.  It can mislead one
into thinking that the paradigm of which other criminal offenses are
normatively derivative is a completed crime of unjustified harm such as 
88. Id. at 154–57. 
89. See H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 8–11 (1968). 
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murder or rape.  The reality, as Plato observed, is just the opposite.90  Because 
criminal law prevents harm by means of punishment, and because punishment 
is just only if it is deserved, the paradigmatic criminal offense is one that 
is constitutive of the elements of criminal desert, namely, the crime of
impossibility attempt.  Impossibility attempts establish the baseline by which
criminal desert is measured, whether actors succeed or fail in their 
wrongful undertakings.91  To be sure, attempts are conceptually derivative of
offenses of unjustified harm and risk because attempts must necessarily
make reference to such offenses.  Normatively, however, impossibility attempts
are anterior to crimes of unjustified harm and risk because impossibility 
attempts consist of the elements that establish an actor’s culpability for 
such offenses. When society punishes completed crimes of grievous harm 
more severely than impossibility attempts, it is not because the former are 
more deserving of punishment than the latter.  It is because society is 
materially aggrieved by the former and, being aggrieved, is indisposed 
to give them anything less punishment than the punishment they deserve.
Second, the emphasis on preventing unjustified harms can mislead one 
into thinking that all offenses consist in part of an actus reus of harm or 
risk—that is, an objective harm or risk that, unless justified by a countervailing 
harm or risk, is a wrong that must be prevented.  However, the latter 
conception fails to account for the crime of attempt.  Attempt does not consist 
of an actus reus as such, and, hence, once a criminal attempt is complete,
it is incapable of justification. Attempt is essentially an offense of intent 
because the law’s purpose in requiring an act of attempt is to ensure that
an actor possesses an intent of a certain kind, namely, an intent that he is 
actually committed to carrying out. 
Finally, the emphasis on preventing unjustified harms can mislead one 
regarding the nature of mens rea. It is commonplace to think that mens
rea consists of culpability regarding the actus reus of offenses, much as
the mens rea of murder consists of malice aforethought regarding acts of 
homicide.  Again, however, this conception fails to account for the crime 
of attempt.  Attempt does contain mens rea elements, to be sure.  However, 
the mens rea of attempt is not directed to the actus reus of attempt.  Quite 
the contrary, the mens rea of attempt is the crime of attempt, the so-called 
90. See supra Section III. 
91. A person who succeeds in committing a completed crime of harm or risk nonetheless 
possesses the elements of an impossibility attempt.
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